Non-Cooperation by popular vote: expectations, foreign intervention and the vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum by Walter, Stefanie et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2016
Non-Cooperation by popular vote: expectations, foreign intervention and
the vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum
Walter, Stefanie; Dinas, Elias; Jurado, Ignacio; Konstantinidis, Nikitas
Abstract: Referenda in Greece and the UK have recently sent shockwaves across Europe. This paper
examines this popular challenge to international cooperation in a systematic fashion by focusing on foreign
policy referenda in which a non-cooperative vote is associated with large negative externalities. Such
high-stakes referenda are unusual because the consequences of a non-cooperative referendum outcome
cannot be controlled by the national government but instead depend on whether the other countries
accommodate or penalize the non-cooperative vote. This implies that voters’ expectations about the
likely reaction abroad will be highly influential for voting behavior. Foreign policymakers can influence
these expectations by sending costly signals ahead of the vote, thus trying to sway the vote in favor of
cooperation. Using original survey data from a recent high-stakes referendum, the 2015 Greek referendum,
we show that expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote had a powerful effect on
voting behavior. Leveraging the bank closure in Greece, we also show that costly signals sent by the
other member states made voters more pessimistic about the consequences of a no-vote and increased
the share of cooperative votes.
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-135087
Originally published at:
Walter, Stefanie; Dinas, Elias; Jurado, Ignacio; Konstantinidis, Nikitas (2016). Non-Cooperation by
popular vote: expectations, foreign intervention and the vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum. In:
IPES 2016 annual meeting, Durham, NC, 11 November 2016 - 11 November 2016, 47.
	 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-cooperation by popular vote:  
Expectations, foreign intervention, and the vote in the 2015 Greek 
bailout referendum 
 
 
 
Stefanie Walter 
University of Zurich 
walter@ipz.uzh.ch 
 
Elias Dinas 
Oxford University 
elias.dinas@politics.ox.ac.uk 
 
Ignacio Jurado 
University of York 
ignacio.jurado@york.ac.uk 
 
Nikitas Konstantinidis 
IE University 
nkonstantinidis@faculty.ie.edu 
 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the IPES 2016 annual meeting, Durham NC 
 
November 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We would like to thank Lucio Baccharo, Mark Hallerberg, Lukas Linsi, Lucas Leemann, 
Gerald Schneider, Marco Steenbergen, Rachel Wellhausen, and participants in seminars at 
the Universities of Mainz, Konstanz, York, Newcastle, Zurich, and Complutense, the LSE, the 
WTI Bern, the “Financial Crisis Management” Workshop in Berlin, and the SPSA and EPSA 
2016 Annual Meetings for helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. We also thank 
Ari Ray for helpful research assistance. 
 
  
	 2 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
Referenda in Greece and the UK have recently sent shockwaves across Europe. This paper 
examines this popular challenge to international cooperation in a systematic fashion by 
focusing on foreign policy referenda in which a non-cooperative vote is associated with large 
negative externalities. Such high-stakes referenda are unusual because the consequences of a 
non-cooperative referendum outcome cannot be controlled by the national government but 
instead depend on whether the other countries accommodate or penalize the non-cooperative 
vote. This implies that voters’ expectations about the likely reaction abroad will be highly 
influential for voting behavior. Foreign policymakers can influence these expectations by 
sending costly signals ahead of the vote, thus trying to sway the vote in favor of cooperation. 
Using original survey data from a recent high-stakes referendum, the 2015 Greek referendum, 
we show that expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote had a powerful 
effect on voting behavior. Leveraging the bank closure in Greece, we also show that costly 
signals sent by the other member states made voters more pessimistic about the consequences 
of a no-vote and increased the share of cooperative votes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After decades of expanding and deepening international cooperation, a new but 
fundamental challenge has emerged for international institutions: popular referenda that put 
countries’ participation in these institutions into question. A prominent example is the June 
2016 “Brexit” referendum in the United Kingdom (UK), in which British voters decided that 
the UK should leave the European Union (EU) - a referendum vote that plunged the EU in 
into its biggest crisis to date.1 Other examples include Iceland’s 2010 and 2011 “Icesave” 
referenda about repudiating foreign debt,2 the Swiss 2014 referendum on the “mass 
immigration initiative,” which mandated a change in domestic immigration law in violation of 
the bilateral treaties between Switzerland and the EU,3 or the 2005 referenda in France and 
the Netherlands that rejected the European Constitution and thus derailed European 
policymakers’ attempt to put European integration on a higher level.4  
What these foreign policy referenda have in common is that the consequences of the 
national direct democratic vote in favor of non-cooperation are not limited to domestic voters, 
but negatively affect other countries as well. Traditionally, these negative externalities abroad 
have been small. When the Swiss decided against joining the UN in a referendum vote in 
1986, for example, the effects were hardly felt abroad. But as the institutionalization of 
international politics has deepened, non-cooperative voting outcomes in foreign policy 
referenda have become more disruptive. This is because a non-cooperative vote not only 
implies that the other countries are being deprived of cooperation gains, but such a unilateral 
decision to withdraw from international cooperation risks putting the long-run viability of the 
entire international institution at risk.  
Our paper therefore focuses on those referenda, in which a popular vote in favor of 
non-cooperation in one country creates large costs abroad. Such high-stakes referenda are 
characterized by two traits that differ from foreign policy referenda in which negative 
externalities are small or non-existent. First, although a country can unilaterally decide not to 
cooperate any more, it cannot unilaterally dictate the terms of the future relationship. This 
means that the concrete consequences of a non-cooperative referendum vote depend to a large 
degree on whether the other members of the respective international institution accommodate 
or penalize this vote. Second, because the other countries will always prefer a cooperative to a 																																																								
1 See for example Owen and Walter (2016) 
2 See Leblang, Jupille, and Curtis (2011) 
3 See, for example, Milic (2015) and Sciarini et al. (2015) 
4 See, for example, Hobolt and Brouard (2010) and Taggart (2006) 
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non-cooperative voting outcome, foreign policymakers have incentives to signal a tough 
stance ex ante in order to induce voters to cast a cooperative ballot. This creates an 
information environment where the true resolve of the other countries to punish or 
accommodate a non-cooperative vote is difficult to assess by domestic voters ex ante and will 
be contested during the campaign. This type of foreign policy referendum therefore takes 
place in a context characterized by high levels of uncertainty about the consequences of a 
non-cooperative vote. 
This paper sets out to explore this challenge to international cooperation in a 
systematic fashion. It examines how voters cast their vote in this uncertain context of a 
foreign policy referendum with potentially large negative externalities, and to what extent 
foreign policymakers can influence their expectations and voting behavior. We argue that 
narratives and expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative referendum outcome 
will be highly influential for voters’ behavior, precisely because these consequences are 
uncertain and depend on the reaction of non-domestic actors to the outcome. Foreign 
policymakers can influence these expectations by emphasizing their retaliatory capacity 
through costly signals ahead of the vote. These can generate uncertainty over the implications 
of a non-cooperative vote, feeding more risk-averse and pro-status-quo choices, compared to 
those who expect that the referendum outcome will be accommodated by international 
partners.  
Empirically, we leverage a high-stakes foreign policy referendum whose potentially 
destructive consequences are rivaled only by the 2016 Brexit referendum: the Greek 2015 
bailout referendum.  Although officially a referendum on the terms of a bailout package 
proposed by the Troika institutions in an effort to overcome the country’s enormous financial 
crisis, most policymakers and observers abroad viewed it as a referendum that jeopardised 
Greece’s continued membership in Europe’s currency union. As such, the referendum put the 
irreversibility of the euro in question and consequently posed a threat to the entire project of 
European monetary integration – with potentially enormous costs for all other members of the 
eurozone. During the campaign, two dominant narratives emerged: the government 
emphasized that a non-cooperative No-vote would enhance Greece’s bargaining power in 
negotiations with its creditors, allowing the government to finally put an end to years of crisis 
and austerity. Most opposition politicians and policymakers outside of Greece, however, 
warned that a no-vote would invariably lead to “Grexit,” Greece’s exit from the common 
currency, the euro. The campaign period was also characterized by an unusual amount of 
international interference. Most notably, the European Central Bank (ECB) declined to further 
	 5 
increase emergency funding for Greek banks further, which forced the Greek government to 
close the banks and to impose capital controls. But despite stark warnings about the potential 
fallout from a non-cooperative vote, the deteriorating economic situation, and the fact that a 
large majority of Greeks strongly favored staying in the euro, Greek voters soundly rejected 
the bailout proposal in the referendum. Taken together, this makes the Greek referendum an 
insightful case to study public opinion in foreign policy referenda with the potential of 
creating large negative externalities for other countries. 
Using original survey data from a poll we fielded a day before the referendum, we 
investigate what role expectations and foreign signals played in influencing individual vote 
choice in the 2015 Greek referendum. Our analysis shows that expectations about the 
consequences of a non-cooperative vote had a powerful effect on voting behavior in the 
referendum: voters expecting that a no- vote would result in “Grexit” were substantially more 
likely to vote cooperatively than those believing that a no-vote would result in new 
negotiations. We also show that there is space for foreign actors to influence voters’ 
expectations and vote choices in their favor. Our results suggest that costly signals about 
possible retaliatory measures of a non-cooperative vote – such as the ECB’s decision not to 
accommodate Greece’s heightened need for further capital injections – increases the share of 
cooperative votes. Overall, our study underscores the unique features of this emerging type of 
foreign policy referendum, especially the importance of expectations about foreign reactions 
and foreign signals.  
 
 
2. Non-cooperative foreign policy referenda: uncertainty, expectations, and foreign 
intervention 
 
Historically, countries with a long tradition in direct democracy have made 
widespread use of referenda as a decision-making institution in local, regional and national 
politics. Yet, with the emergence of a wide array of global governance structures and 
institutions of supranational cooperation, the use of referenda as instruments of international 
politics has proliferated. By its very nature, the consequences of a domestic referendum vote 
on a foreign policy issue are felt beyond the borders of that country; thus, the outcome of a 
direct democratic vote in one country not only affects domestic voters, but has ramifications 
for the citizens of other countries as well.   
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Whether these externalities are positive or negative depends on the outcome of the 
referendum. Whenever such a referendum leads to an initiation, widening, deepening, or even 
just continuation of international cooperation, these externalities tend to be positive.5 
Successful ratification referenda are typical examples of such referenda with cooperative 
voting outcomes, for example the 1992 Swiss referendum vote to join the Bretton Woods 
institutions, the 2007 Costa Rican referendum vote to join the Central American Free Trade 
Area, or the many accession and treaty referenda that have furthered European integration 
over the past 45 years (for overviews, see Hobolt 2009; Hug 2003).  
In contrast, whenever a referendum results in a non-cooperative vote, which either 
prevents further integration (i.e., failed ratification referenda) or even mandates some form of 
non-compliance with or disintegration from an international institution, it creates negative 
externalities. 6 These negative externalities can be small – Switzerland’s 1986 referendum 
vote not to join the UN had little effect on other countries –, but they can also be substantial. 
They are most pronounced in those cases in which a non-cooperative referendum vote 
mandates a unilateral withdrawal of the referendum country from an international institution 
or non-compliance with the rules of such an institution. For one, such referenda unilaterally 
challenge the status quo of the existing cooperative agreement with the aim of improving the 
referendum country’s position vis-à-vis its foreign partners. They also produce negative 
economic externalities, such as foregone gains from trade, cooperation, and coordination 
across one or multiple policy areas (Konstantinidis, 2015), as well as the transaction costs and 
economic distortions and financial risks that can arise as economic agents adjust to the new, 
disintegrated, environment.7 Most importantly, however, such referendum votes threaten to 
undermine the long-run viability of the international institution as a whole through political 
contagion (‘domino’) effects. These political contagion effects can manifest themselves in 
terms of (i) signaling a lack of commitment to the irreversibility of cooperation and resolve to 																																																								
5 Because countries usually only agree to international cooperation if it improves their national welfare (Keohane 
and Nye 1977), the successful ratification by one country allows all concerned countries to share the gains from 
cooperation. 
6 Note that even the announcement of a referendum itself can give rise to negative externalities just by dint of the 
uncertainty it creates with respect to the outcome. A characteristic example of that is the run of events that led to 
the resignation of the Papandreou government in Greece in November 2011 following the Prime Minister’s 
unilateral decision to call for a national referendum on the EU bailout and austerity package. This caused an 
ireful response on the part of the country’s EU partners in the G20 summit meeting in Cannes, as it was 
perceived as a reckless political gamble that jeopardized the future of the Euro. Ironically enough, it also drew 
the criticism among others of one of the opposition party leaders, a certain Alexis Tsipras. 
7 Note that, even for less integration-prone member states, a unilateral, referendum-based decision to defect by 
one member state is worse than a cooperative bargaining solution aimed at disintegration. The market turmoil 
following the UK vote to leave the EU, which in fact hit several European stock markets harder than the British 
one, and the deep political crisis the referendum result has caused for the EU are but two examples of how 
significant the costs of a unilateral decision to quit an international institution can be. 
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enforce the existing policy framework, (ii) inducing similar non-cooperative behavior by 
other countries seeking to extract higher relative gains of cooperation by threatening to call a 
referendum on overall membership or specific agreements, and (iii) stoking further anti-
integration sentiment by boosting the electoral prospects of populist anti-establishment 
parties. As such, these effects can effectively jeopardize the viability of the international 
cooperation agreement in its entirety. Naturally, fears of political contagion tend to be most 
pronounced in the context of deep, politically interconnected, and highly institutionalized 
organizations.  
Overall, a non-cooperative vote in a foreign policy referendum generates negative 
spillovers for the other members of any given international institution. Yet, the magnitude of 
these negative externalities varies widely. Whereas the costs of failed ratification referenda 
that simply imply the non-participation of the referendum country in an international regime 
are small, they are larger when they prevent the other countries from cooperating more 
closely. This is the case, for example, whenever there is a unanimity requirement for an 
agreement to come into effect)8 The 1992 rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by Danish voters, 
the 2005 rejections of the European Constitution or, most recently, the 2016 rejection of the 
Ukraine–EU Association Agreement are examples for failed ratification referenda in this 
category. Yet, although these referenda undoubtedly create negative externalities for the other 
countries in the form of foregone gains from cooperation, they seldom challenge the existing 
status quo of cooperation at its core. On the other hand, foregone economic benefits are 
compounded by political contagion effects (as well as second-order economic externalities) 
when it comes to referenda with a potential disintegration outcome. Therefore, the stakes of 
‘disintegration’ referendum votes for the other members of an international institution are a 
lot higher as it can put the survival of the entire institution on the line. The 2016 Brexit 
referendum and the harsh reactions by the remaining EU-27 countries illustrate these negative 
externalities in high-stakes referenda nicely. 
Therefore, from the point of view of remaining member states, the costs of non-
cooperation vary. In the case of high-stakes ‘referenda’, a non-cooperative vote is highly 
disruptive of a given cooperative political and economic environment, which most societal 
actors have taken time to accommodate and internalize. On the other hand, a failed ratification 																																																								
8 Clearly, the potential negative spillovers of failed ratification are a direct function of the institutional rules for 
the implementation of an international cooperation agreement, whether that is by unanimity, qualified majority, 
‘enhanced cooperation’, ‘critical mass’, etc. The recent example of the rejection of the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU by the Belgian regional parliament of 
Wallonia is quite telling in that regard, as CETA was subject to unanimous ratification and, therefore, even the 
smaller political actors wielded substantial veto power and the ability to generate disproportionate negative 
externalities on others. 
	 8 
referendum may at worst lead to the continuation of the status quo ante, i.e., the political and 
economic environment before any agreement of further cooperation was discussed, 
negotiated, let alone implemented. As a result, the stakes the other countries have in the 
outcome of a foreign policy referendum abroad vary. The larger the externalities, the higher 
the stakes. 
 
Responding to a non-cooperative referendum outcome 
A non-cooperative referendum vote in one country confronts the affected countries 
abroad with the question of how to respond. The range of options is large. For example, in the 
case of a failed ratification referendum, should the others modify the agreement to make it 
more acceptable to the referendum country (as in the case of the Maastricht Treaty 
exemptions granted to Denmark after its ‘No’ referendum vote in 1992) in accordance with 
the logic of ‘two-level’ games (Putnam 1988), should they dismiss the agreement altogether 
and negotiate a new agreement (as the EU did after the French and Dutch rejected the 
European Constitution in the 2005 ratification referenda), or should they go ahead without the 
referendum country (as the EEA did after Switzerland decided not to join the organization in 
1992)? Similar questions arise when voters decide to partially or fully withdraw from an 
international organization or agreement. Should the other member states accommodate the 
democratically expressed wish of the (other) people and focus on salvaging as many of the 
cooperation gains from the existing arrangement as possible even if this may create moral 
hazard? Or should they punish the referendum country for its move to defect in order to 
discourage similar referenda and disintegration moves amongst other member states, even 
though such punishment is likely to be costly for everyone involved?9  
A non-cooperative referendum vote with negative spillover effects thus presents the 
afflicted countries with a dilemma between accommodating the referendum country at the risk 
of encouraging similar referenda and demands in the future (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 
1996; Walter 2006) and punishing the referendum country for non-compliance at the risk of 
jeopardizing all gains from cooperation. 10 This dilemma tends to be starkest when the 																																																								
9 Such punishment can take different forms. An example is the EU’s reaction to Switzerland’s referendum vote 
in 2014 to restrict immigration and its government’s subsequent decision not to extend the freedom of movement 
of to nationals of the new EU member state of Croatia in violation of the bilateral treaties with the EU. The EU 
retaliated by barring Switzerland’s access to the new Horizon 2020 research program. This, of course, 
predominantly hurt the research community in Switzerland, but also negatively affected research collaborations 
with Swiss participation across Europe. 
10 This dilemma can be best illustrated by considering the debates on how the EU should respond to the UK’s 
referendum vote to leave the EU in 2016. The EU’s options in response to Brexit range from allowing the UK 
continued full access to the single market to excluding it altogether from the single or any other EU programs. 
While granting the UK continued access would maintain existing economic ties and hence preserve many 
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negative externalities of a non-cooperative vote are large. Importantly, however, these high-
stakes referenda are also the cases where the range of response options tends to be largest.  
Whatever the most likely strategic response on the part of other member states, their 
response to a non-cooperative popular vote will shape and condition the true underlying 
stakes of the referendum vote. From the viewpoint of the referendum country, these stakes are 
lowest when a non-cooperative vote carries small negative externalities, and highest in 
referenda in which the stakes are high for the other countries. In the case of treaty ratification 
failure, for example, the ‘reversion point’ – defined here as the likely outcome of a non-
cooperative referendum vote – is at worst the status quo ante of no agreement, an outcome 
whose consequences are relatively predictable and manageable. But the range of possible 
outcomes also include another referendum on more or less the same agreement (e.g., the Irish 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, which failed in 2008 and passed in a second referendum in 
2009), or a more favorable agreement to the referendum country subjected to a second 
popular vote (e.g., the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, which failed in 1992 and 
passed with amendments in 1993).11 On the other hand, the worst possible ‘reversion point’ of 
a unilateral non-cooperative vote is that the other countries make no concessions and let the 
country leave without any alternative arrangement that salvages cooperation gains. But 
potential reversion points also include the extreme volatility associated with the chain effects 
of political contagion and complete disintegration of the institutional arrangement, a 
withdrawal on an amicable basis, or even an improved and highly favorable new cooperative 
agreement.12  
 
Uncertain outcomes and the role of expectations 
Because the reversion point lies beyond the sole control of the country holding the 
referendum and instead depends on the reactions of the other countries, the consequences of a 
non-cooperative referendum vote will always be uncertain ex ante. Of course, uncertainty and 
a lack of full information about outcomes is a feature of any referendum, irrespective of 																																																																																																																																																																													
cooperation gains in the other member states, the remaining EU-27 member states are weary that such a strategic 
response might put the entire European project at risk in the long run. In contrast, the punishment strategy might 
dampen others’ incentives to defect, but would come at a high economic price for both Britain and the remaining 
member states. 
11 For a discussion of the role of the reversion point in these referenda, see Hobolt (2009). Whereas referenda 
increase the international bargaining power of the referendum country during treaty negotiations (e.g., Hug and 
König 2002; Schneider and Cederman 1994), this is much less clear for ex post re-negotiations. 
12 The full range of these potential outcomes was clearly evident in the campaigning rhetoric and strategies of 
both sides of the ‘Brexit’ referendum, where the Remainers’ so-called ‘project fear’ about the potential 
repercussions of Brexit was juxtaposed by the Leave side’s ‘project doom’ about the effects of immigration and 
the emergence of a European superstate. There were also those who argued that a Leave vote would in fact lead 
to a renewed and more favorable membership agreement for the UK. 
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whether the issue at hand is a domestic or international (see, for example, Bowler and 
Donovan 2000; Christin, Hug, and Sciarini 2002; Hobolt 2009; Kriesi 2005; Lupia 1994; Selb 
2008). All referenda are subject to a certain amount of uncertainty about the consequences of 
a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote, because future developments can never be perfectly predicted. But in the 
context of a foreign policy referenda in which the negative externalities of a non-cooperative 
vote are large and in which the policy reaction to the vote cannot be controlled by the national 
government, the uncertainty associated with a non-cooperative vote is significantly higher 
than usual. As no objectively verifiable information (or even precedent in the case of 
‘disintegrative’ referenda) exists about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote, and 
because these consequences depend not only on domestic policymakers but also on the 
reaction of foreign policymakers, it is very difficult to predict in advance what the outcome of 
such a vote will be. In addition to the regular uncertainty about policy effects, these referenda 
thus are associated with a more fundamental type of uncertainty, uncertainty about the policy 
as such.  
The uncertainty is further intensified by the fact that policymakers abroad have 
incentives to misrepresent their true willingness to accommodate a non-cooperative vote 
before the referendum. Because all potential outcomes of a unilateral non-cooperative 
referendum vote are worse for the other countries than those outcomes associated with a 
cooperative referendum outcome, they have a strong preference for a cooperative referendum 
vote and are likely to make threats and promises to induce voters to cast a cooperative ballot. 
This strategic incentive to misrepresent their true resolve and to manipulate voters’ 
perceptions over the true costs and benefits of different responses to a non-cooperative vote 
makes it difficult for domestic voters to form consistent beliefs about the potential 
consequences of a non-cooperative vote ex ante, a difficulty that is compounded by the fact 
that other countries are often hard-pressed to present a common front and express a clear and 
unified position before the vote.  
As a result, such referenda take place in a context characterized by unusually high 
levels of uncertainty. This special setup has consequences for the referendum campaign and 
voting behavior in such referenda. The campaigns surrounding such referenda are likely to be 
characterized by conflicting and often contradictory messages and narratives about the risks 
and benefits associated with a non-cooperative vote (see for example Hobolt 2009). During 
the domestic referendum campaign, the proponents of a non-cooperative vote are likely to 
exploit the private information problem of foreign policymakers, emphasizing their strategic 
incentives to misrepresent resolve ex ante and arguing that ex post, they are likely to 
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accommodate a non-cooperative referendum vote. Moreover, they are likely to point out that 
a non-cooperative vote can be used as a bargaining chip for domestic policymakers to extract 
concessions from the other member states within the existing international institution ex 
post.13 In contrast, proponents of a cooperative vote will emphasize the risks of non-
cooperation, including the risk that the other countries will deprive the referendum country 
from access to any cooperation gains as punishment for its defection. Because an emphasis of 
the negative effects of a certain referendum choice depresses the vote for this choice (Hobolt 
2009), each side has an incentive to misrepresent the ‘reversion point’ as either being entirely 
in the domain of pure gains or that of pure losses. This is why the anti-integration side 
oftentimes presents the non-cooperative vote as one in which “we have nothing to lose” (pure 
gains), while the pro-integration side will tend to frame the vote as one where “we have 
everything to lose” (pure losses). 
 In such an environment, voters will form very different expectations about the likely 
outcomes of a non-cooperative and a cooperative vote and will vote accordingly. This in itself 
is, of course, not unusual for referendum campaigns. Existing research has demonstrated that 
the information environment (Bowler and Donovan 2000; Hobolt 2005; Lupia 1994; Vreese 
and Semetko 2004) and the arguments put forth in a referendum campaign (Hobolt 2009; 
Kriesi 2005; Schuck and de Vreese 2009) influence voting decisions in popular referenda. We 
therefore expect that voters’ expectations about how foreign actors will react to a non-
cooperative referendum vote will be a main driver of voting behavior in a high-stakes foreign 
policy referendum. Those expecting retaliatory measures will be more likely to vote for 
continued cooperation, while those expecting an accommodating response from the other 
member states will be more likely to vote in favor of non-cooperation.  
Existing empirical evidence from high-stakes ratification referenda and from 
independence referenda, which allow for non-cooperative votes in a subnational context, 
underlines the importance of expectations in such contexts of uncertainty. Using survey 
experiments, Hobolt (2009) shows that support for a non-cooperative vote decreases when 
respondents are primed to think about the consequences of such a vote. Similarly, analyses of 
vote intentions in favor of disintegration (i.e., secession) in independence referenda in Québec 
(Blais, Martin, and Nadeau 1995), Catalonia (Muñoz and Tormos 2015), and Scotland 
(Curtice 2014) show that voters diverge widely in their views on what the consequences of 
																																																								
13 Examples for such concessions include the Danish exceptions from the Masstricht treaty after their 1992 
referendum-no or the post-‘Icesave’ negotiations on debt repayment modalities between Iceland, the UK, and the 
Netherlands.  
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independence would be and that these differences in expectations have a significant effect on 
vote intentions. 
Expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote should therefore 
strongly affect vote intentions in addition to and independent of partisanship, material 
interests, and attitudes, which have been found to be important drivers of voting decisions in 
regular ratification referenda (e.g., Hobolt 2009; Jupille and Leblang 2007; Milic 2015; 
Urbatsch 2013). This means that whereas in most instances partisan and issue preferences are 
aligned with preferences, in high-stakes foreign policy referenda we are more likely to see 
instances where preferences and expectations diverge, and where expectations trump 
preferences. 
 
Can foreign policymakers influence the referendum vote? 
If expectations about the reactions of the other member state are central in shaping the 
vote decision in disintegration referenda, the question emerges whether foreign policymakers 
can influence these expectations, and, ultimately, vote intentions in their favor during high-
stakes foreign policy referendum campaigns.  
Foreign policymakers can try to sway voters towards a cooperative vote by coaxing 
them through normative appeals and promises of future benefits or by threatening them with 
punishment in the case of a non-cooperative referendum outcome. These ‘stick-and-carrot’ 
strategies have frequently been employed in recent high-stakes referenda. As an example, 
recall Barack Obama’s speech during the Brexit referendum campaign, in which he both 
emphasized the importance of the British voice in the EU, but also warned that Brexit would 
put the UK at the “back of the queue” for trade talks with the US. Research on the effects of 
foreign interventions on public opinion and voting abroad is surprisingly scarce, and the few 
existing studies focus predominantly on democracy promotion and present mixed results. One 
study finds overt interventions by great powers are effective (Levin 2016), another finds a 
polarizing effect of foreign interventions on public opinion (Corstange and Marinov 2012) 
and a third study indicates that such interventions can lead to a backlash (Shulman and Bloom 
2012). 
What is clear, however, is that the strategic setting makes influencing domestic public 
opinion through foreign interventions a difficult task: not only can such statements be 
counterproductive, but foreign policymakers face private information problems and time-
inconsistency problems that make it difficult for them to credibly communicate their actual 
resolve to punish a non-cooperative vote (Fearon 1995; Powell 1999). Voters may well realize 
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that punishment for a non-cooperative vote also imposes costs on those countries that punish, 
increasing the likelihood that they will accommodate a non-cooperating vote ex post in spite 
of threats to sanction the country ex ante. Both threats and promises may hence be dismissed 
as cheap talk, rendering them ineffective.  
Much research in international relations has shown that one way to overcome such 
information problems is to send costly signals that reveal the actor’s true resolve, in this case 
the ex post willingness to punish the referendum country for a non-cooperative vote (Fearon 
1995; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001). By engaging in activities that create costs not only for 
the referendum country, but also for the other member states, foreign policymakers can more 
credibly convey that they would not be willing to accommodate the referendum country’s 
non-cooperative vote. For example, ceasing to cooperate in certain policy areas during the 
campaign phase with visible and costly consequences for both domestic and foreign actors is 
likely to strengthen voters’ expectations that a disintegrative vote will have negative 
consequences. Such costly signals make the threats by the other countries that they would be 
unwilling to grant any concessions to the referendum country becomes more credible, raising 
the expected costs of a non-cooperative vote and hence decreasing the likelihood that voters 
will cast such a vote in the first place.14 We therefore expect that credible signals from foreign 
policymakers should make voters more pessimistic in their expectations about the 
consequences of a non-cooperative vote. Moreover, individuals tend to place more weight on 
the possibility of negative scenarios, rather than positive payoff probabilities (Baumeister et 
al. 2001). This means that by increasing expectations of negative consequences, foreign 
policymakers should be able to influence the voting decisions of citizens in the referendum 
country. Costly and credible signals should hence increase the likelihood that voters decide to 
vote against disintegration in the referendum. 
To summarize, foreign policy referenda in which the stakes of other countries are high 
create incentives for foreign policymakers to intervene into domestic referendum campaigns. 
To credibly signal their resolve, they need to make these interventions costly. Nonetheless, 
the uncertainty about the likely response of other countries to a non-cooperative vote will not 
																																																								
14 The incumbent’s position will determine the extent to which its interests are aligned with those of international 
actors and foreign elites and, thereby, affect the credibility latter’s signals and statements. When the incentives 
of the incumbent government and international actors are openly aligned in favor of the cooperative option, one 
would expect international signals or statements to have a weaker effect on voting behavior over and beyond that 
of the incumbent, as they would just be construed as ‘part and parcel’ of the incumbent's campaign. In contrast, 
when the incumbent and the international actors are on opposing sides of the argument (as a result of failure to 
reach an agreement at the supranational level), such international signals and actions are likely to have a stronger 
effect. 
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be fully resolved ex ante, making expectations about the likely reactions and the associated 
consequences of such a vote an important determinant of voting behavior in such referenda. 
 
3. The 2015 Greek bailout referendum  
To study the role of expectations and the impact of foreign intervention in high-stakes 
foreign policy referenda, we focus on a prominent example of such a referendum: the July 
2015 bailout referendum in Greece. Although officially a referendum on the specific terms of 
a new bailout package for Greece, this referendum created high risks for all members of the 
Eurozone because it was widely believed across Europe that a failure to agree to the terms of 
the bailout package would lead to Greece’s exit from the European currency union, the so-
called “Grexit.” Many observers both in Greece and abroad feared that such a Grexit would 
lead to contagion across the Eurozone and could potentially spell the end of European 
monetary integration. The potential costs of a non-cooperative referendum outcome in the 
Greek referendum for the other member states were consequently very large. Not surprisingly, 
foreign intervention in the referendum campaign was unusually high. These features make the 
Greek bailout referendum an insightful case for studying the role of expectations and the 
effects of foreign intervention in foreign policy referenda. 
 
A short primer on the Greek bailout referendum 
Greece has experienced one of the deepest and most prolonged economic crises in 
recent decades (Gourinchas, Philippon, and Vayanos 2016). After the crisis started in 2010, 
Greece received two European and international bailout programs in return for drastic 
austerity measures and structural reforms. Yet these programs failed to bring economic 
recovery. Against this backdrop of half a decade of crisis, the radical left party SYRIZA was 
elected into office in early 2015 with a mandate to implement two contradictory goals: 
keeping the country in the euro-zone, while at the same time ending austerity. No sooner than 
formed, the new government declared its intention to renegotiate the conditions attached to 
the existing bailout package from a near-zero basis with the creditors. A series of Eurogroup 
meetings ensued, none of which ended with an agreement – although the country faced 
increasing liquidity problems and the deadline for the expiration of the bailout program on 30 
June 2015 was approaching. 
Events escalated quickly over the summer. On June 24, the European Commission 
made what President Juncker would four days later call the ‘last proposal creditors made to 
Greece’. It was the first time that a proposal coming from the creditors had been given a take-
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it-or-leave-it character. The Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras rejected the ultimatum and 
broke off negotiations with the creditors, accusing them of blackmail and characterizing the 
proposal as an attempt to humiliate Greece. Two days later, Tsipras surprised everyone by 
calling a referendum on the proposal, to be held only one week later.15 Shocking many 
European policymakers, he openly recommended that voters reject the proposal. Rejecting the 
conditions set out in the agreement, Tsipras argued, would enhance Greece’s bargaining 
power in renewed negotiations with its international creditors, allowing the government to 
finally put an end to years of crisis and austerity. The next day, the finance ministers of the 
Eurozone met and refused to extend the ongoing bailout program, scheduled to end three days 
later. As a consequence, the ECB announced that it would not increase the emergency funds it 
had been supplying to keep the Greek banking system afloat. Faced with a bank run in the 
making, the Greek authorities imposed a bank holiday and capital controls on the next day, 
which were to last at least until the day after the election.16 The next major international event 
occurred two days later, when the deadline for an IMF loan expired and Greece became the 
first developed country ever to default on its debt to the IMF. Despite these unprecedented 
events and the high costs associated with these disputes, the Prime Minister went public for a 
second time to reiterate his support for the no-camp.  
An intense campaign week followed. Two dominant narratives emerged in the public 
discussion, in which all major political parties took very clear stances. The three moderate 
pro-EU parties Nea Democratia, PASOK and To Potami as well as European policymakers 
warned that a non-cooperative no-vote would inevitably result in Greece’s exit from the 
Eurozone. They therefore advocated strongly for an approval of the bailout package (a yes-
vote). In contrast, the no-camp, led by prime minister Tsipras and supported by the 
government parties SYRIZA and ANEL, as well as the radical right-wing Golden Dawn, 
argued that a rejection of the agreement would lead to a better bargaining position for Greece 
that would eventually result in less austerity and more debt forgiveness. This second narrative 
emphasized that a no-vote would strengthen Greece’s bargaining position in renewed 
negotiations with her creditors and would hence lighten austerity in Greece. Greece’s 
membership in the Eurozone was not at risk, this narrative maintained, because Europeans 
																																																								
15 On the domestic politics of calling a discretionary foreign policy referendum in the first place, see for example 
(Bjørklund 1982; Dür and Konstantinidis 2013). This research suggests that there is a strategic 
interconnectedness of these decisions as well as the extent to which the use of referenda tends to signal the 
divisiveness and complexity of the issue in question.  
16 The bank closure eventually lasted three weeks and capital controls still remain in place at the time of writing. 
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would not want to damage the EMU project by pushing Greece out of the euro.17 Faced with 
competing claims about the consequences of a no-vote for the future of Greece and the euro-
zone, Greek voters were thus exposed to very different narratives about the potential 
consequences of a non-cooperative vote. 
The Greek referendum campaign also saw an unusually large involvement of 
international politicians and an unusual escalation of events involving foreign actors. Foreign 
policymakers such as European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, IMF Chief 
Christine Lagarde and the German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble got involved in the 
national referendum campaign to an unprecedented degree. They strongly advocated a yes-
vote and threatened that a no-vote would result in a loss of euro membership.18 Moreover, by 
declining to extend a hand to Greece as the second bailout package expired and forcing it to 
close its banks and to impose capital controls, international institutions such as the ECB and 
the IMF became central actors during the campaign.  
Despite these efforts to sway Greek voters to vote cooperatively, the July 5 
referendum ended with a 61-39 landslide victory in favor of the No camp. Greeks had rejected 
the creditor proposal and had cast a non-cooperative vote.  
 
Alternative explanations for voting behavior in the Greek bailout referendum 
How can we explain the non-cooperative vote? Our argument suggests that 
expectations about the likely consequences of a non-cooperative vote should be a key driver 
of voting behavior. But existing research suggests three alternative determinants of vote 
choice in referenda: partisanship, issue preferences and material interests.  
Much research has shown that voter’s partisan identification is a strong determinant of 
the vote in popular referenda. Voters use partisan cues as shortcuts to determine their stance 
on a specific referendum question (e.g., Garry, Marsh, and Sinnott 2005; Hobolt 2007; Lupia 
1994; Urbatsch 2013), because party positions have a heuristic value for voters that allow 
them to overcome cognitive and information limitations around the referendum question (Lau 
and Redlawsk 2001; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1993). A party also has the capacity to 
frame the issues at stake (De Vreese, 2002) and can therefore influence the analysis of the 
benefits and costs, or perceptions and expectations of those voters who find themselves 
closely aligned with it (Hobolt 2006; Kriesi 2005; Zaller 1992). Finally, foreign policy 																																																								
17 Note that especially Golden Dawn and a few far-left members of SYRIZA supported a no-vote because they 
favored leaving the euro. 
18 See for example https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/29/greek-crisis-referendum-eurozone-vote-
germany-france-italy 
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referenda often turn into a contest about the incumbent parties’ popularity (e.g., Dür and 
Konstantinidis 2013; Schneider and Weitsman 1996). Three features of the Greek referendum 
suggest that partisan cues and heuristics should be particularly influential in explaining vote 
choice: First, the campaign was very polarized and dominated by the major political parties, 
which fully supported either the no- (SYRIZA, ANEL, Golden Dawn) or yes- (Nea 
Democratia, PASOK, To Potami) narrative, generating partisan effects which should have 
been further reinforced by the foreign interventions (Corstange and Marinov 2012). Second, 
the government left voters very little time to decide on a highly technical and complicated 
issue. With only slightly more than a week, the campaign period was very short, strongly 
curtailing the possibility of a public and informed deliberation and discussion by both camps 
on the consequences of a yes- and a no-vote. Third, this problem was exacerbated by the fact 
that the referendum question was unusually complicated, asking voters to vote on two draft 
documents that the creditors had submitted before the Greek government had called the 
referendum.19 
In addition to partisan cues, issue preferences and material interests have been found 
to guide voters’ choices in a referendum. For example, attitudes towards European integration 
have been found to be a main driver of voting behavior in EU referenda, even when this 
means going against the preferred party’s position (Hobolt 2009; Siune and Svensson 1993; 
Siune, Svensson, and Tonsgaard 1994; Svensson 2002). For the Greek referendum, this 
suggests that respondents’ wish to keep the euro should have a strong influence on their vote 
choice. Past research has also shown that material interests affect referendum choices. For 
example, voters who stand to benefit the most from integration are most likely to oppose non-
cooperation (Christin, Hug, and Sciarini 2002; Leblang, Jupille, and Curtis 2011; Tomz 
2004). Since the educated individuals tend to disproportionally benefit from international 
economic exchange, this suggests that more educated people should be more inclined to case 
a cooperative ballot. In contrast, those voters who have been hurt most by austerity should be 
most inclined to vote against the bailout package, either in the hope that a re-negotiation or 
regaining monetary policy autonomy in a post-Grexit world would lead to less austerity. 
Because the young have been hit hardest by austerity in Greece, the no-vote should decrease 
with age. Although older Greeks have suffered from pension cuts and rising health care costs, 
they have been less severely affected than younger Greeks, whose poverty rates have 																																																								
19 The precise question read: “Should the plan of agreement be accepted, which was submitted by the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund in the Eurogroup of 25.06.2015 
and comprises of two parts, which constitute their unified proposal? The first document is entitled 'Reforms for 
the completion of the current program and beyond' and the second 'Preliminary debt sustainability analysis'."  
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increased significantly more strongly than those of pensioners, both in absolute terms and in 
comparison to pre-crisis levels (Matsaganis and Leventi 2014). Likewise, the unemployed, 
private sector employees and the self-employed have been hit harder than public officials, 
whereas pensioners have seen much lower decreases in their incomes (Matsaganis and 
Leventi 2014) and vote intentions should vary accordingly. 
Because existing research suggests that partisan identification, issue preferences (or 
attitudes), and material interests should be particularly influential in the context of the 2015 
Greek referendum, this case provides a good testing ground for our argument that 
expectations are likely to play a particularly important role in non-cooperative referenda. If 
we find that expectations have a strong and independent effect on vote choice beyond the 
typical determinants of voting behavior in referenda, this would provide evidence that 
expectations are unusually important in the context of a this type of referenda.  
 
 
4. Research Design and Data 
 
To understand why Greek voters decided to vote no in the referendum and what role 
expectations and foreign interventions played in this context, we use original survey data from 
a poll we conducted on Saturday, 4 July 2015, one day before the referendum. Our 
nationwide, computer-assisted telephone survey covered 989 respondents identified through a 
multistage sampling process.20 As our survey was fielded just some hours before the polling 
stations opened, it allows us to gain a very accurate depiction of the motives of the Greek 
people and of their vote. Although few surveys predicted the strong rejection of the creditor 
proposal in the referendum correctly, our survey mirrors the actual referendum outcome quite 
closely, increasing our confidence in the validity of the results. Among those planning to vote, 
58.0% of respondents in our sample said they would reject the bailout package, which is very 
close to the 61.3% rejection rate in the actual referendum. 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. We first analyze the role of expectations in 
explaining vote choice in the Greek referendum using both regression analysis and matching 
methods. We then explore the ability of foreign policymakers to shape voters’ expectations 																																																								
20 In the first stage (cluster sampling), electoral districts were chosen, in the second stage (stratified sampling) 
strata within each cluster were identified based on socioeconomic characteristics and finally, in the third stage 
(SRS), a simple random sample was drawn within each stratum. Because the interviews were done on fixed 
telephone lines, we get some underrepresentation of the youngest respondents and an overrepresentation of 
female respondents. We therefore use population weights in our analyses to match the basic demographics of the 
Greek population. The data was collected by the University of Macedonia (UoM) Research Institute of Applied 
Social and Economic Studies in Thessaloniki (Greece) 
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about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote through costly signals. For this purpose, we 
concentrate on the effect of the ECB’s decision not to increase emergency liquidity assistance 
to Greek banks, which forced the Tsipras government to close the banks, arguably the biggest 
event in the campaign period. We also show evidence from a survey experiment that threats 
from international actors can sway voters’ preferences about international commitments, 
particularly when they come from those with high stakes on them. Overall, we show that 
expectations were the most important predictor of individual vote intentions in the Greek 
2015 bailout referendum, and that these expectations were influenced by European 
policymakers’ decisions. 
 
Operationalization 
Our main variables of interest in the first part of the analysis are the vote intention in 
the referendum and expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote.21 To 
measure vote intention, we use respondents’ answers to the following question: “As you’re 
probably aware, PM Alexis Tsipras announced a referendum regarding the ratification of the 
agreement that Greece’s creditors offer, that will take place on next Sunday, July 5th. What 
are you going to vote in the referendum?” The left-hand panel in figure 1 displays 
respondents’ answers. It shows that a large majority of voters had made up their mind about 
their referendum vote at this point in time, with a majority (52.8% of our weighted sample) 
stating that they would probably or certainly vote no. For the purposes of our analysis, we 
create a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if voters stated that they intended to vote 
against the creditor proposal in the referendum (the disintegrative no-vote) or were leaning 
towards doing so, and 0 otherwise.  
Voters’ expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote are measured 
with respondents’ answers to the question “What do you think will be the consequences of a 
No-vote?” Respondents could choose between three options: (i) “Greece will exit the 
Eurozone” reflecting the narrative of the yes-camp, i.e. the moderate political parties and 
European policymakers, that the reversion point of a non-cooperative vote would be very 
costly, (ii) ”The government will continue negotiations,” which captures the no-camp’s, 
including the government’s, narrative that the consequences of a no-vote would be positive or 
negligible, and (iii) “Don’t know/don’t answer.” The right-hand panel in figure 1 shows that a 
clear majority believed that a non-cooperative vote would result in continued negotiations, 
whereas only about one quarter of respondents believed that a no-vote would lead to “Grexit.”  																																																								
21 Table A1 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics of all variables. 
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Figure 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Note: Based on UoM survey from 4 July 2015. Data are weighted.  
 
As discussed above, past research has identified a number of important alternative 
explanations for variation in referendum vote intentions. We therefore control for 
partisanship, issue preferences, material interests and sociodemographics. To control for 
partisan and incumbency effects, we use the vote recall from the January 2015 general 
election in Greece and create dummy variables for the main political parties in Greece: the 
governing parties SYRIZA and ANEL, the conservative opposition party Nea Democratia 
(reference category), the centre-left Pasok, the centrist the River (To Potami), and the radical 
right Golden Dawn. We also include a dummy variable for those who abstained in the January 
elections and the other options.  
To control for issue preferences, we focus on voters’ view of the euro. To consider 
whether a no-vote simply reflects respondents’ wish to leave the Eurozone, we asked 
respondents what they personally thought was best for Greece’s future: staying in the euro or 
adopting a national currency and created three dummy variables based on their answers. The 
data shows that more than three quarters of respondents (76%) wanted to keep the euro, 
whereas only 13% said they preferred to leave the euro. Only about one tenth of respondents 
were undecided about this issue or did not answer. 
In terms of material interests, we expect that those benefitting most from continued 
cooperation and those sheltered most from austerity measures should be more supportive of a 
yes-vote than those who have borne the brunt of Greece’s adjustment program. We use three 
types of information to proxy for material interests: age, occupation, and education. As 
discussed above, we expect younger voters to be more opposed to the austerity measures 
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proposed in the bailout proposal than older voters, and hence more likely to vote against it. 
Age is operationalized in six categories — 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and over 65 
years old—, and we include it as a continuous variable in all models. To reflect the varying 
vulnerability to austerity across occupational categories, we generated dummy variables for 
the following types of occupations: public sector employee, private sector employee, 
unemployed, farmers, entrepreneur, pensioners and others. Finally, Education is an ordinal 
variable with the following categories 1) no education or primary studies; 2) secondary; 3) 
post-secondary and 4) tertiary education. We also control for gender and whether the voter 
lives in a rural or urban area. 
 
 
5. Vote choice in the 2015 Greek referendum  
 
What determined individual voting decisions in the Greek 2015 bailout referendum, 
and how did expectations about the consequences of a rejection of the creditor proposal shape 
vote intentions?  
Figure 2 gives a first descriptive answer to this question. It shows that expectations 
about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote played a powerful role in the referendum.  
whereas preferences about staying or leaving in the Eurozone played a more moderate role. A 
strong majority (86%) of respondents voiced a clear opinion on what the consequences of a 
no-vote would be and among them we find remarkable differences in their voting behavior: 
only one in ten of those who expected a no-vote to result in Grexit chose to vote ‘No’. In 
contrast, among those who expected that a no-vote would result in new negotiations, more 
than three-quarters planned to vote no in the referendum. The comparison of each side with 
the undecided is telling. Switching from a DK/DA to a “Grexit” expectation implies a 19 
percentage points decrease in the probability of voting no, whereas expecting the continuation 
of negotiations increases in the chance of a no-vote by 34.5 percentage points.22 In contrast, 
respondents wishing to keep the euro split their vote almost equally between yes- and no-
votes. 23 
 
 																																																								
22 The 95% confidence intervals indicate a decrease in the probability of voting No (Yes) that ranges between 28 
(28.9) and 9.5 (39.9) percentage points.  
23 Of those wanting to keep the euro, 43% voted yes and 47% voted no, of those wanting to adopt a national 
currency, 4% voted yes and 92% voted no. 
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2a Expectations and Vote Intention  2b Euro Preferences and Vote Intention 
  
Notes: Based on UoM survey from 4 July 2015. Data are weighted.  
Figure 2: Expectations, Preferences, and Vote Intention  
 
The importance of expectations for the vote intention is confirmed when we move to a 
more sophisticated analysis that controls for the range of alternative explanations that existing 
research on EU-related referenda has emphasized. Figure 3 shows the change in the 
probability of voting no as a result of moving to the different variable values from the 
respective baseline categories.24 The multivariate analysis shows that the expectations had 
very strong effects on individuals’ voting decision. In line with the descriptive results, a 
preference to reintroduce a national currency strongly increased the odds of voting no, 
whereas a preference to keep the euro reduced these odds (although to a lesser extent). We 
also find strong partisan effects: voters of the centrist parties Nea Demokratia (the baseline 
category), PASOK and To Potami were all significantly less likely to vote no than voters of 
the governing parties Syriza and ANEL as well as the right-wing Golden Dawn, all of which 
had campaigned in favor of a no vote. These results show that voters tended also to vote in 
line with their preferred party’s recommendation. Substantively, and taking the partisan 
effects globally, these are somewhat larger than in other studies (Hobolt 2007; Hug and 
Sciarini 2000), suggesting that parties played a particularly important role in the referendum 
campaign. Given the polarized campaign, the short decision time and the complicated 
referendum question, this is not surprising. In contrast, demographics do not seem to matter 
																																																								
24 The full logit regression analysis can be found in table A.2 (online appendix). 
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much once these partisan and Euro preferences are taken into account. The only exception is 
age, where older voters are, as expected, less likely to vote no than younger voters.  
But even after controlling for all these other influences on individuals’ vote choices, 
the marginal effects of the expectation variables remain large and statistically significant, 
indicating an independent effect from the rest of explanations. In fact, the magnitude of 
expectation effects is comparable to the partisan effects. All else equal, a switch in 
expectations from Grexit to Negotiations shifts the probability of voting No by more than 
40%.25 
 
 
Figure 3: Determinants of the NO-Vote in the July 2015 Greek referendum.  																																																								
25 The results remain robust when we also impute an indicator of nationalism and add it as a control variable in 
the model and when we additionally controling for respondents’ evaluation of EU membership. More details are 
provided in the Online Appendix. 
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Note: Dots indicate estimates of change in the estimated probability of voting No as we move from the 
reference category to each category denoted in the vertical axis. Reference categories are as follows: 
DK/DA (expectations and Euro questions); 18-24 age group; pensioner; primary education; Nea 
Demokratia (vote choice); and male. Logit regression analysis, 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Of course, expectations are likely to be shaped by partisan narratives, so that the effect 
of expectations might just be an artifact of partisan effects. To examine this more closely, we 
investigate the role of expectations using data pre-processing techniques, which are less 
model-dependent, more efficient (since comparison is made among similar units), and allow 
us to evaluate more transparently the degree of similarity in pre-treatment covariates between 
control and treated units (Sekhon 2009).26 The “treatment” in our analysis is the expectation 
that “a No vote means Grexit,” whereas the other two options—“Negotiations will continue” 
and “DK/DA”—are grouped together as the control category.27 The intuition behind this 
analysis is that we try to assess the effect of different expectations on individuals’ vote 
intentions among otherwise almost identical individuals.  
We employ two methods of data pre-processing, namely genetic matching and entropy 
balancing.28 The first is a nearest-neighbor matching method with balance optimization, based 
on a generalized distance metric that assigns weights to each covariate included in the 
matching. This method has been shown to outperform other matching estimators in 
recovering simulation and experimental benchmarks (Diamond and Sekhon 2013).29 The 
second is a generalization of a propensity score weighting approach that directly incorporates 
covariate balance into the weight function that is applied to the sample units (Hainmueller 
2012). Although there were clear imbalances in the raw data, all differences evaporate after 
both matching and entropy balancing, including the two most obvious attitudinal 
confounders—partisan preferences and attitudes towards the euro. After entropy balancing, 																																																								
26 Matching only assures balance on observable characteristics. The identifying assumption is that unobserved 
characteristics of control and treatment observations are similar. This is a plausible assumption in many cases 
because it is reasonable to think that if two voters are very similar across a wide range of crucial observable 
characteristics, such as partisanship, unobserved characteristics may also behave similarly. While this argument 
is frequently used also to justify OLS estimation, the goal of matching is precisely to assure balanced 
observations while in a regular regression framework covariates control for general differences across all 
observations.  
27 We choose the Grexit option as the treatment status because it leaves the modal category in the control group, 
thus increasing the pool of control units to be selected for the matching. In the Appendix, we replicate the 
analysis using the “Negotiations will continue” option as the treatment status, placing the “Grexit” option 
together with the DKs in the control group. Balance is now worsened, although the treatment effect estimates are 
substantively identical. 
28 Although the two methods differ in how they arrive into balance, we treat them both here as variants of 
matching techniques. 
29 Weights are determined by a loss function, which is defined as maximizing the minimum balance statistic, 
determined by the t-test and the KS-test for each covariate. 
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the means of the two groups are practically identical for all variables. We present the balance 
statistics and a detailed discussion in the online appendix. 
Figure 4 displays the findings of our matching analyses. Both produce very similar 
estimates, which reassures the robustness of the results. We use the Average Treatment Effect 
on the Treated as our estimand of interest. On average, individuals who expected Grexit in 
response to a no-vote were approximately 32 percentage points less likely to vote against a 
continued cooperation with the creditors, than individuals who are identical with respect to 
partisan predispositions, attitudes about the Euro and key demographics, but who believed 
that a no-vote would result in new negotiations. Our matching analyses thus confirm that 
expectations about the day-after significantly shaped the vote in the 2015 Greek referendum. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Average Treatment Effect of “Grexit” expectations on the likelihood of voting 
No in the Greek Referendum 
Note: Black dots denote the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, with Abadie Imbens standard errors 
accompanying them. Using these standard errors, the horizontal closed segments indicate the 95% confidence 
intervals in the case of genetic matching and linearized confidence intervals in the entropy balancing case. 
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6. Can foreign policymakers influence expectations and the vote? 
 
The Greek case also provides a good environment to examine foreign policymakers’ 
possibilities to influence voters’ expectations and, ultimately, vote intentions in their favor. 
This is because the 2015 Greek referendum campaign was characterized an unusually large 
involvement of foreign policymakers. This did not only involve stark warnings that Greeks 
would decide about Greece’s future in the Eurozone in the referendum, but actual measures 
were taken to increase pressure on Greece and to signal European policymakers’ resolve. 
Most notably, the ECB decided that it would not further increase emergency funding to Greek 
banks after the Eurozone’s finance ministers had decided to let the existing bailout agreement 
expire in the midst of the referendum campaign. Faced with massive capital flight, this 
decision forced the Greek government to close the country’s banks and to impose capital 
controls. This drastic measure massively damaged the Greek economy. But it also increased 
the eventual costs for the country’s international lenders, because it was clear that this damage 
would increase the amount needed for an eventual third bailout package (about the need of 
which there was never any doubt on either side, irrespective of the referendum outcome). The 
ECB decision thus had costly consequences for everyone involved, and it can be interpreted 
as a costly signal from foreign policymakers to Greek voters about the EU’s resolve not to 
accommodate a disintegrative vote easily.  
Both the bank holiday and the capital controls thus were intended as strong signals to 
voters about what future a disintegrative no-vote would hold for Greece. PM Tsipras directly 
blamed the bank holiday on the Eurogroup, whose aim was, in his words “to blackmail the 
will of the Greek people,”30 so that it was widely understood that the bank closure was related 
to foreign decisions. Our argument suggests that such a signal of foreign resolve to punish the 
country for a disintegrative vote should shift voters’ expectations in favor of a more 
pessimistic evaluation of the consequences of a no-vote. Given the importance of expectations 
in shaping voting decisions, this should then decrease the likelihood of a no-vote. 
To examine whether this is the case, we run two types of analysis. First, we provide 
evidence from a survey experiment we conducted two days before the referendum was called 
to show that foreign actors have the ability to sway people’s preferences about domestic 
decisions with international implications, such as whether Greece should pay the debt. 
																																																								
30 http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/28/news/economy/what-greek-prime-minister-tsipras-said/ 
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Secondly, we conduct a more specific analysis of our referendum data to show that the bank 
closure was perceived as a signal of which were be the consequences of a No vote.  
First, we use evidence from a survey experiment conducted on a sample of 2003 
respondents on June 24th 2015, when the referendum had still not been called (and was not 
perceived as an option by public opinion)31. We asked respondents whether they thought that 
Greece should pay the county debt or whether they were in favour of stop paying it. To test 
whether actors can influence people’s preferences over the fulfillment of international 
commitments, we included three treatments. All of them report that not paying the debt can 
make the situation worse for Greece, but in each treatment we include a different actor 
making such statement. One of them is a domestic actor, Yannis Varouafais, which at the time 
was Greece’s Finance Minister. The other two are international actors: Wolfgang Schäuble- 
which was the German Finance Minister and represented the largest creditor of Greece- and 
Mario Draghi –the ECB’s President. More specifically, the question formulation was the 
following: 
“Varoufakis (Treatment 1) / Schäuble (Treatment 2)/ Draghi (Treatment 3)/ recently 
confirmed that the situation could get worse if we stop paying their creditors. Thinking of all 
this, would you say that the country should continue to repay their lenders or stop doing? 
Please answer using a scale where "1" means that we should stop paying their creditors and 
"5" means we must continue to pay their lenders.”  
The control group received only the second part of the statement with no mention to 
whether the situation could get worse (the statement in bold). 
Figure 5 shows the results32. Two things are worth highlighting. First, results show 
that domestic actors are less able to influence citizens’ preferences over international 
commitments. The Varoufakis treatment is not significant. The threat provided by a domestic 
actor is less informative, as the potential consequences of a default are not in her hands. 
Second, we find a positive effect on willingness to pay the debt of the Schäuble treatment. 
Germany was Greece’s largest creditor and therefore it represents the actor that had more at 
stake if Greece stopped paying the debt. Finally, we do not find a significant effect of the 
																																																								
31 As with our referendum survey, data were collected by the University of Macedonia’s Research Institute of 
Applied Social and Economic Studies in Thessaloniki (Greece) with a nationwide, computer-assisted telephone 
survey using a multistage sampling process. 
32 We run OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the 5 point scale of willingness top ay the debt. We 
include, apart from the treatment variables. vote recall (SYRIZA, ND, PASOK, ANEL, The River, Golden Dawn, 
or others) in the January elections, age and gender as control variables. 
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Draghi treatment. This is an external actor, but his threat is less relevant as it is not the 
immediate actor harmed by the default.33 
 
 
Figure 5: Effect of threat treatments on debt repayment preferences. 
 
These results show that foreign actors directly affected by the non-fulfillment of 
international commitments can sway citizens’ opinions and preferences by signaling which 
can be their reaction to the country’s behavior and the consequences. 
We turn now to analyze this question more specifically for the referendum on July 4th. 
From a more descriptive perspective, we can see that when the bank closure was announced, 
this had an effect on the polls. The closure was announced on June 28 and became effective 
on June 29. In Figure 6 we can observe that the bank restrictions bumped up the support for 
the Yes option in the referendum, bringing predicted outcome to a much narrower margin. We 
take all polls published in Greece and classify them according to the date of fieldwork34 and 
divide them between those previous to the bank shutdown and posterior to the bank 
shutdown. In figure 6 we plot the % of Yes voters in each poll35. We plot two local 
polynomial regressions estimated on both sides of the figure, determining the change in Yes 
voters in the polls before and after the bank shutdown. It can be observed that there is a bump 
in favour of the Yes camp of approximately 10% of the vote. 
																																																								
33 We have interacted the experimental treatments with the vote recall variable, but we do not find a significant 
differential effect of the threat by partisanship. 
34 For those cases where the date of fieldwork was not available, we take the date the poll was published. When a 
poll was conducted over two days, we consider the field work was conducted between both days. Data can be 
found here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_bailout_referendum,_2015 
35 We plot the % of yes voters over all voters that declared an intention to vote yes or no. 
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Figure 6: Effect of the bank shutdown on published polls. 
 
We can trace more closely the effect of the bank closure in our referendum survey. We 
asked voters if they had changed their vote intention as a result of the bank shutdown. About 
one fifth (21%) of all voters answered affirmatively. We use this question to analyze whether 
this effect of the bank holiday is a predictor of expectations about the consequences of a no-
vote in the referendum. Because our dependent variable, expectations, is trichotomous,36 we 
employ a multinomial regression model, where those that “did not know” or “did not answer” 
serve as reference category. This allows us to investigate whether shifts to and from this 
category can be attributed to the bank closure after controlling for all the covariates included 
in the previous analyses.37 
Figure 7 shows the determinants of respondents’ expectations about the consequences 
of a no-vote. In line with our findings on the determinants of the vote intention, our results 
show that partisan attachments and attitudes about the euro matter influence expectations 
about the consequences of a ‘No’ vote. The strong and contradictory partisan narratives 
during the referendum campaign resonated with voters: Compared to moderate Nea  																																																								
36 We use the same operationalization as above. The three categories are “Grexit”, “new negotiations”, and 
“don’t know/no answer.” 
37 The full multinomial analyses can be found in table A.3 (online appendix). To mirror the previous analyses, 
we also conducted matching analyses to estimate the effect of the bank holiday on expectations. The analyses are 
shown in the online appendix. Both approaches produce near-to-perfect balance and similar ATT estimates: for 
the genetic matching approach the ATT of the bank holiday on Grexit expectations is -0.090 (Abadie-Imbens 
standard error 0.045), for entropy the ATT is estimated at 0.085 with standard error 0.039.  
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Expectation: Grexit Expectation: New Negotiations 
 
Figure 7: Determinants of Expectations about the Consequences of a No-vote. 
 
Note: Dots indicate estimates of change in the estimated probability of expecting Grexit (left panel) or new 
negotiations (right panel), compared to the “don’t know/no answer” category based on multinomial logit 
regression analysis, with 95% confidence intervals. Reference categories of the predictors are the same as in 
figure 3.  
 
Democratia (the baseline category), PASOK and To Potami voters, voters of the government 
parties ANEL and especially Syriza were significantly more likely to believe that a no-vote 
would result in new negotiations and significantly less likely to think that such a vote would 
force the country to leave the Eurozone. With regard to euro-preferences, our results show 
that those wishing to stay in the Eurozone (and, though not at a statistically significant level, 
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those wishing to reintroduce a national currency) were significantly more pessimistic about 
the consequences of a no vote than those without an opinion on the euro. In terms of 
sociodemographics, citizens with a university education were significantly more likely to 
expect adverse consequences from a non-cooperative vote, in line with arguments that they 
should better understand the constraints on nation-states in a globalized world. Public sector 
workers and entrepreneurs were less likely to expect Grexit, but all other sociodemographic 
variables, including age and unemployment, had no statistically significant effects on voters’ 
expectations.  
The most relevant result, however, is that after controlling for all these influences on 
voters’ expectations, the bank closure also qualified people’s expectations. Those who 
changed their vote intention because of the bank shutdown were significantly less likely to 
believe that a no-vote would result in new negotiations.38 Substantively, the bank shutdown 
reduced the predicted probability of this belief by almost 20 percentage points. At the same 
time, the bank closure increased the expectations that a no-vote would push the country to exit 
the Eurozone by almost 10%. The decision of European policymakers to be tough on 
Greece’s liquidity during the referendum campaign thus made some voters more pessimistic 
about the consequences of a no-vote in the referendum.39  
Overall, these results shows that the decision by European policymakers to take a hard 
line on Greece did indeed convince some voters that they would not accommodate a no-vote 
in the referendum. Our analysis suggests that international actors can indeed affect 
expectations in referendum campaigns through costly signals. But does this translate into 
meaningful changes in individual voting behavior? In short, can foreign policymakers sway 
referenda vote through costly signals? 
Descriptively, our data suggest that foreign policymakers achieved their goal among 
12.3% of respondents, who changed their vote intention to yes as a result of the bank holiday. 
4.9% switched to undecided, whereas the bank closure hardened the stance of 3.8% of 
respondents, who changed their vote intention to no.  
Turning to a more systematic analysis of how the ECB decision influenced vote 
intentions by making voters more pessimistic about the outcome of a no-vote, we instrument 
expectations through the bank holiday, while trying to predict the referendum vote. The 
underlying logic of this analysis is that if the bank holiday had an impact on the referendum 																																																								
38 We have also explored interactive effects between the bank shutdown and partisan variables, but did not find 
any meaningful result. 
39 We obtain substantively identical estimates of the effect of the bank closure on expectation, when using 
genetic matching to condition on the same list of covariates shown in Figure 5. The results of this analysis are 
presented in the Online Appendix (Figures A.4 and A.5). 
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vote, this was by raising the expectations that a no-vote would result in Grexit. The 
assumption necessary for unbiased estimation is that the bank holiday did not affect the vote 
in any other way apart from qualifying people’s expectations about the consequences of 
defection.40 To strengthen the validity of this assumption, we also condition on the set of 
covariates included in the previous analysis.  
 
Table 1: IV estimation of the effect of expectations on a No-vote in the referendum. 
 Grexit 
Expectations 
(First-Stage) 
No Vote 
(Reduced Form) 
No Vote 
(Wald 
Estimator) 
No Vote 
(2SLS 
Estimator) 
No Vote 
(LARF 
Estimator) 
Bank Holiday 0.093 
(0.036) 
-0.341  
(0.031) 
   
Grexit   -3.405   
(0.901) 
-3.679   
(1.334) 
-3.801   
(1.499) 
Covariates X X  X X 
N 989 989 984 984 984 
Note: All estimates are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. The last column presents 
Local Average Response Function estimates, with standard errors into parenthesis. 
 
The results are presented in Table 1. The first column confirms the results of the 
previous analysis that the bank holiday increased Grexit-expectations, which also validates 
presence of first stage. The second column presents the reduced form, showing the Intent-To-
Treat effect of the bank holiday on the referendum vote. As expected, the bank holiday makes 
a no-vote significantly less likely. The last three columns display the IV results, thus using the 
predicted values of Grexit expectations from the first stage (column 1) as a predictor of the 
referendum vote. The third column employs the Wald estimator, thus adding no covariates in 
the estimation. We find a negative effect of Grexit expectations on the referendum vote, 
suggesting that the bank holiday reduced the no-vote by convincing voters that such a vote 
would lead to Grexit. This effect remains robust when adding the full list of covariates used in 
the previous analyses. Finally, the last column relaxes the assumption of constant treatment 
effect along strata of the covariates, using a more flexible local response estimator. The 
results remain practically and substantively intact.  
These findings show that the decisions abroad that led to the bank shutdown and 
capital controls influenced expectations about the consequences of a no-vote and increased 																																																								
40 An alternative path through which the bank holiday and capital controls might have affected the vote is by 
raising nationalist sentiments against what was perceived as an implicit violation of national sovereignty. In this 
case, however, the bank holiday would shift attitudes towards the No option and would thus weaken the first 
stage of the analysis, thus adding noise to the second-stage estimates and increasing the chances for a type-two 
error. That said, first stage still seems to be relatively strong, as shown in the first column of Table 1.  
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the chances of a yes-vote. However, considering the huge cost that the ECB’s decision 
generated, both for Greece and the other European states, the payoff of changing the minds of 
approximately 12.3% of voters towards a cooperative vote seems meager, especially since it 
was not enough to change the referendum outcome. Nonetheless, our results suggest that 
foreign actors might have the possibility of influencing the final referendum outcome when 
the race is close. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Used to ever closer integration, European politics has recently been confronted with a 
new challenge: popular referenda aimed at disintegration. This paper has provided a first stab 
at understanding this new type of referendum in a systematic fashion. Despite all the apparent 
differences between the 2014 Swiss mass immigration referendum, the 2015 Greek bailout 
referendum, and the 2016 Brexit referendum, what unites these referenda is that votes in one 
country spelled potentially serious harm to voters outside the referendum country. At the 
same time, the consequences of a non-cooperative vote in such high stakes referenda are 
largely determined by whether the other members of the respective international 
accommodate or penalize this vote. The involvement of foreign actors in a domestic 
referendum makes such high stakes foreign policy referenda unique and creates a strategic 
setting that is more complicated than in traditional ratification referenda in which the stakes 
for other countries are lower. 
Our paper has explored one implication of this strategic setting: The role of 
expectations about the foreign reaction to a disintegrative vote in shaping vote intentions, and 
the ability of foreign policymakers to influence these expectations. Leveraging survey data 
from the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, we showed that expectations about the 
consequences of a no-vote had an unusually large impact on vote choice in the Greek 
referenda. Our analysis also suggested that foreign policymakers were able to influence these 
expectations among some voters by sending a costly signal about their determination not to 
accommodate a no- vote in the referendum. The main contribution of this article has therefore 
been to unpack the popular dynamics and strategic interactions in high stakes foreign policy 
referenda referenda. Most research on the mass politics of international cooperation to date 
has focused on domestic audience costs (e.g., Chaudoin 2014; Tomz 2007). But in an 
increasingly interconnected world in which voters abroad can influence the welfare of voters 
in other countries, foreign interventions aimed at public opinion abroad are likely to become 
more frequent and more consequential. Because existing research has so far only concentrated 
	 34 
on how foreign leaders can influence voters abroad in the context of democracy promotion 
(Corstange and Marinov 2012; Levin 2016; Shulman and Bloom 2012), developing a better 
understanding of the strategic incentives and the effectiveness of such interventions between 
ore developed democracies is therefore important.  
Our empirical findings from the Greek case raise the question to what extent they are 
generalizable to other high stakes foreign policy referenda. Although a systematic analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper, some descriptive evidence from other referenda gives us some 
insights about the external validity of our findings. Figure 7 shows the distribution of 
expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative referendum outcome in three other  
referenda: the 2016 Brexit referendum and the “Against Mass Immigration” and “ECOPOP” 
referenda which were both held in Switzerland in 2014 and which aimed at defecting from 
Switzerland’s bilateral treaty with the EU on the free movement of people. 
The evidence from these other referenda suggests that expectations about the 
consequences of a non-cooperative vote also diverge in other high-stakes referenda. However, 
the effect seems to depend on the context. Whereas expectations about the riskiness of a 
Brexit diverge widely between the Leave and Remain camp, for example, this divergence was 
much less pronounced in the case of the ECOPOP referendum. This latter referendum was 
rejected by 74% of voters, whereas the outcome was much narrower in the other two 
referenda. Moreover, the pro-ECOPOP camp comprised many voters who believed that a 
termination of the bilateral treaties with the EU would be a good thing.  
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23 February 2016 
VoxIt: Abstimmung Nr. 114, post-
referendum poll 
VoxIt: Abstimmung Nr. 117, post-
referendum poll 
Figure 5: Expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote and 
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These results point to a number of open questions that future research should 
investigate: how are signals and statements by foreign policymakers received in different 
contexts? How costly do such signals have to be in order to sway voters in favor of supporting 
continued cooperation? And, moving up one level of analysis, how do foreign policymakers 
react ex post after voters in one country cast a non-cooperative vote?  
In more general terms, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the mass 
politics of international cooperation. Although the role of mass publics has been 
acknowledged with regard to the creation of international agreements, voters’ ability to shape 
or terminate international cooperation once an agreement has been signed has traditionally 
been limited. International institutions tend to leave little room for ex-post opt-out clauses, 
because they are designed to limit and punish “defection” by individual countries and to 
ensure continued cooperation (Keohane 1984; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; 
Simmons 2010). This has led to a circumscribed role of domestic publics in influencing their 
country’s international behavior within existing international institutions. Only recently have 
voters begun to challenge existing international institutions at the ballot box. The potential of 
domestic voters to terminate international agreements unilaterally poses new challenges and 
questions for international cooperation. Our paper therefore underlines the challenges 
democracies face in highly integrated countries where the international and the domestic level 
interact to shape the form and level of international cooperation. Reflecting the increasing 
dilemmas domestic voters face between the gains from international cooperation, democracy, 
and national sovereignty (Rodrik 2011), popular movements aimed at non-cooperation are 
likely to keep these countries occupied for some time to come.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics (unweighted) 
Variable Name N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Referendumno 989 0.502 0.500 0 1 
Expectation: No=Grexit 989 0.265 0.442 0 1 
Expectation: No=Negotiation 989 0.584 0.493 0 1 
Education 984 2.814 1.211 1 4 
Age 989 4.146 1.411 1 6 
Female 989 0.594 0.491 0 1 
Rural 989 0.589 0.492 0 1 
Unemployed 989 0.122 0.328 0 1 
Public Sector Employee 989 0.118 0.323 0 1 
Private Sector Employee 989 0.196 0.397 0 1 
Pensioner 989 0.259 0.438 0 1 
Entrepreneur 989 0.140 0.347 0 1 
Bank holiday changed vote intention 989 0.229 0.420 0 1 
Syriza 989 0.363 0.481 0 1 
ANEL 989 0.031 0.174 0 1 
Nea Demokratia 989 0.178 0.383 0 1 
PASOK 989 0.051 0.219 0 1 
River 989 0.052 0.221 0 1 
Golden Dawn 989 0.032 0.177 0 1 
Abstention 989 0.108 0.311 0 1 
Preference: Stay in Euro 989 0.772 0.419 0 1 
Preference: Leave Euro 989 0.113 0.317 0 1 
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Online Appendix 
 
Table A.2: Determinants of the NO-Vote in the July 2015 Greek referendum. Logit models 
 
Dependent variable: 
 Intention to vote No in referendum 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Expectation: Grexit -1.198*** -1.303*** -1.511*** 
 
(0.310) (0.413) (0.414) 
Expectation: More Negotiations 2.186*** 2.187*** 2.172*** 
 
(0.223) (0.293) (0.304) 
Age 
 
-0.288*** -0.338*** 
  
(0.097) (0.102) 
Unemployed  
 
-0.307 -0.260 
  
(0.424) (0.456) 
Public Sector Employee  
 
-0.146 -0.274 
  
(0.371) (0.371) 
Private Sector Employee  
 
-0.271 -0.310 
  
(0.348) (0.376) 
Entrepreneur 
 
-0.412 -0.447 
  
(0.363) (0.559) 
Farmer 
 
-0.353 -0.353 
  
(0.522) (0.522) 
Other Occupation 
 
-0.308 -0.310 
  
(0.406) (0.443) 
Education Level 
 
0.0517 0.038 
  
(0.0751) (0.081) 
Female 
 
0.314 0.278 
  
(0.213) (0.224) 
Rural  
 
0.201 0.297 
  
(0.204) (0.220) 
Syriza 
 
2.652*** 2.795*** 
  
(0.333) (0.341) 
ANEL 
 
2.287*** 2.055*** 
  
(0.844) (0.905) 
PASOK 
 
-0.0607 0.009 
  
(0.647) (0.631) 
To Potami 
 
0.321 0.471 
  
(0.534) (0.560) 
Golden Dawn 
 
2.895*** 2.955*** 
  
(0.735) (0.867) 
Abstention 
 
1.401*** 1.338*** 
  
(0.380) (0.406) 
Other Party 
 
1.376*** 1.355*** 
  
(0.350) (0.365) 
Preference: leave euro 
 
-0.676** -1.056*** 
  
(0.329) (0.385) 
Preference: stay euro 
 
1.984*** 2.192*** 
  
(0.612) (0.614) 
Nationalism (imputed) 
  
0.129** 
  
  
(0.589) 
Constant -0.975*** -1.489* -0.135 
  (0.198) (0.855) (0.989) 
    Observations 989 984 984 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A2 shows the logit regression anaylsis for vote intentions, on which figure 3 is based. In 
column 3, we additionally control for  nationalist sentiments, because the various Greek 
bailout packages have strongly curtailed sovereign Greek policymaking. Nationalist 
	 41 
individuals should hence be more inclined to vote against the creditor proposal in order to 
assert their right to self-determination. Because we do not have any information about 
individuals’ level of nationalism in our July 2015 survey, we impute this variable based on 
information from a follow-up survey that we conducted in September 2015 {Dinas, 2015 
#2373} that asked respondents about their the degree of agreement with the statement ‘The 
Greek have suffered more than other people’ (ranging from 1-totally disagree- to 5-totally 
agree.41 
 
  
																																																								
41 Results are robust to using answers to the statement ‘Contemporary Greeks are successors of the inglorious 
Ancient Greek civilization’ instead. We impute nationalistic sentiments in our referendum survey using the 
political independent variables described above and the referendum vote recall from the September survey. The 
results using the imputed variable are robust to excluding the referendum vote to simulate the missing values of 
nationalistic sentiments for the July survey. We did 20 imputations applying Rubin’s combination rules, as 
suggested by White, Royston, and Wood {, 2011 #2374}. 
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Table A.3: Effect of bank holiday on expectations. Multinomial Logit (Expectations Reference 
Category: DK/DA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Expectation: 
Grexit 
Expectation: 
Negotiations 
Expectation: 
Grexit 
Expectation: 
Negotiations 
Expectation: 
Grexit 
Expectation: 
Negotiations 
Bank Holiday -0.163 -1.041*** -0.0964 -0.909*** -0.0963 -0.909*** 
 (0.217) (0.206) (0.242) (0.225) (0.241) (0.225) 
25-34   0.237 0.0197 0.228 0.007 
   (0.833) (0.743) (0.833) (0.747) 
35-44   0.0430 -0.503 0.039 -0.511 
   (0.745) (0.659) (0.746) (0.760) 
45-54   0.226 -0.232 0.218 -0.240 
   (0.737) (0.654) (0.737) (0.655) 
55-64   -0.495 -0.740 -0.494 -0.749 
   (0.737) (0.651) (0.737) (0.652) 
Over 65   -0.997 -1.184* -0.997 -1.191* 
   (0.751) (0.663) (0.751) (0.666) 
Unemployed    0.384 0.165 0.362 0.402 
   (0.454) (0.412) (0.419) (0.381) 
Public Sector Employee    -0.623 -0.115 -0.663 0.0524 
   (0.428) (0.376) (0.408) (0.359) 
Private Sector Employee    0.691 0.276 0.0141 0.256 
   (0.420) (0.377) (0.347) (0.318) 
Entrepreneur   -0.0166 0.126 -0.0580 0.308 
   (0.420) (0.384) (0.385) (0.354) 
Farmer   -0.120 -0.518 -0.427 -0.706 
   (0.441) (0.394) (0.504) (0.443) 
Other Occupation   -0.00683 -0.654 -0.389 -0.385 
   (0.577) (0.507) (0.357) (0.320) 
High School   0.584* 0.426 0.884*** 0.711** 
   (0.344) (0.303) (0.324) (0.281) 
Post High School   -0.311 -0.139 0.0143 0.121 
   (0.506) (0.422) (0.491) (0.406) 
University   1.182*** 0.330 1.451*** 0.603** 
   (0.346) (0.308) (0.327) (0.289) 
Female   -0.157 -0.297 -0.110 -0.286 
   (0.242) (0.219) (0.235) (0.213) 
Rural   0.384 0.306 0.410* 0.324 
   (0.235) (0.212) (0.232) (0.210) 
Syriza   -0.768** 1.384*** -0.732** 1.422*** 
   (0.328) (0.306) (0.323) (0.301) 
ANEL   -2.478*** 0.392 -2.348*** 0.493 
   (0.867) (0.542) (0.862) (0.538) 
PASOK   0.200 0.0553 0.167 0.0331 
   (0.473) (0.508) (0.470) (0.505) 
To Potami   -0.447 -0.538 -0.406 -0.508 
   (0.455) (0.494) (0.447) (0.489) 
Golden Dawn   -0.606 0.726 -0.400 0.933 
   (0.693) (0.619) (0.688) (0.616) 
Abstention   -0.428 0.653* -0.421 0.683* 
   (0.397) (0.377) (0.389) (0.371) 
Other Party   -1.123*** 0.328 -1.030*** 0.401 
   (0.340) (0.317) (0.336) (0.314) 
Preference: leave euro   0.524 -0.474 0.594 -0.387 
   (0.587) (0.428) (0.582) (0.424) 
Preference: stay euro   1.027** -0.312 0.982** -0.344 
   (0.464) (0.329) (0.461) (0.327) 
Nationalism (imputed)     0.033 -0.0924 
     (0.107) (0.2423) 
Observations 989 989 984 984 984 984 
Constant not shown. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Matching Analyses 
 
Balance statistics 
 
Figure A1: Balance statistics using “Grexit“ as treatment 
Note: The black dots present the p-values from the difference-of-means test between treated and control group 
from the unmatched dataset (BM). The black triangles represent the p-values from the matched dataset (AM).  
The red dot denotes the p-value of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test of distributions between treated and control 
groups in the unmatched dataset. The red triangle indicates the p-value from the matched dataset. All variables 
are binary apart from the propensity score, which is treated as a continuous variable. 
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Figure A.2: Balance statistics using “Negotiations“ as treatment. 
Note: The FIgure replicates Figure 2 of the main text, using the „negotiations“ option as the treatment indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3: Standardized mean differences before and after entropy balancing. 
Note: The dots denote the standardized difference between treated and control groups. The 
left panel shows these mean differences before entropy balance whereas the right panel shows 
the same differences after entropy balancing. 
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Figure A.4: Standardized mean differences before and after entropy balancing. 
Note: The graph replicates Figure 3 of the mian text, using the „negotiations“ option as the treatment category. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3: The effect of “Negotiations” expectations on the No vote in the Greek 
Referendum. 
Note: The graph replicates Figure 4 of the main text, using the “negotiations” option, instead of the “Brexit” 
option as the treatment category. 
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Figure A.4: Balance in pretreatment covariates for those affected and those not affected 
by the bank holiday. 
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Figure A.5: Change in probability of expecting Grexit/Negotiations due to the bank 
holiday, estimates from the Genetic Matching Analysis. 
Note: The point estimates denote the difference in the probability of Grexit/Negotiations expectations compared 
to the DK/DA option. Horizontal bars denote the 95% confidence intervals. Estimates represent Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated, obtained by a comparison of means on the matched dataset, as generated by the 
genetic matching analysis shown in the previous Figure. 
 
 
 
●
●
Grexit
Negotiations
−0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2
Difference in Predicted Probability
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
Ca
te
go
ry
: D
K/
DA
